Egypt and Sudan have ramped up their opposition to the recently adopted Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), signifying a new phase in the ongoing regional contention over water resources. Now endorsed by six upstream nations, the CFA officially became effective on October 13, further widening the rift between countries along the Nile.
Cairo and Khartoum, long the dominant forces in discussions over the Nile’s waters, issued a joint statement following the Egyptian-Sudanese Permanent Joint Technical Commission for the Nile Waters (PJTC) meeting held in Cairo on October 11-12. Their stance was unmistakable: they believe the CFA’s enactment endangers the region’s fragile equilibrium. Both countries called for reinstating the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and advocated for a more inclusive framework that deters unilateral decisions by upstream nations. “The six-nation commission under the incomplete CFA cannot represent the interests of the entire Nile Basin,” the statement declared.
The joint statement emphasized that the newly formed six-member Nile River Basin Commission, established under the CFA, fails to represent the collective interests of all the riparian countries. “This agreement cannot speak for the entire Nile Basin,” the PJTC asserted, casting doubt on the new body’s legitimacy.
The ratification of the CFA by Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda has intensified regional tensions. Although the agreement seeks to create the Nile River Basin Commission to ensure fair water distribution, Egypt and Sudan’s main objection lies in their perception that the CFA challenges long-standing water rights established under the colonial-era 1929 and 1959 Nile River Agreements. These treaties, which granted Egypt and Sudan the majority of the Nile’s water, are still recognized under international law.
Egypt’s opposition to the CFA stems from its reliance on the Nile for 98% of its water resources. President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi reinforced this during his recent address at the Cairo Water Week, highlighting that water security is Egypt’s foremost concern. “We cannot afford to lose even a drop of water,” he emphasized, voicing Egypt’s deep concerns over Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam—a massive hydropower project that has become a symbol of modernity and independence for Ethiopia but poses a significant threat to Egypt and Sudan’s control over a vital resource they’ve relied upon for millennia.
The CFA’s ratification by upstream countries, including Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Kenya, has unleashed a wave of political and geopolitical consequences. Ethiopia views both the CFA and the dam as crucial for its economic progress, while Egypt has been reinforcing its ties with other African nations, including Somalia, to counterbalance Ethiopia’s growing influence.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has praised the ratification of the CFA as a landmark move toward a fairer distribution of the Nile’s resources. “We are united in our vision for sustainable development, benefiting all Nile Basin countries,” Abiy declared earlier this year. Nevertheless, his remarks have done little to alleviate the concerns of downstream nations.
The broader geopolitical effects of the Nile dispute are also becoming more apparent. In August, Cairo and Mogadishu signed a military cooperation agreement aimed at curbing Ethiopia’s growing power in the Horn of Africa. Somalia welcomed Egypt’s offer to deploy peacekeepers as part of the African Union Mission to Support Stabilization in Somalia (AUSSOM), which is set to replace the departing ATMIS mission in December.
This agreement follows a trilateral summit in Asmara, Eritrea, where leaders from Somalia, Egypt, and Eritrea pledged to enhance security cooperation. Egypt’s increasing military presence in Somalia, including arms supplies and peacekeeping forces, is seen as a strategy to counter Ethiopia’s influence in the region, especially following Ethiopia’s signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to access Somaliland’s coast for a naval base. Ethiopia has voiced concerns over Egypt’s involvement in Somalia, fearing that it could destabilize the region and threaten Ethiopia’s own strategic interests, including access to the Red Sea and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
